Booze, Bottles and Brussels: Member States’ Dilemma on Alcohol Health Warnings

By Dr Nikhil Gokani, Lecturer in Consumer Protection and Public Health Law, Essex Law School

Nikhil is Chair of the Alcohol Labelling and Health Warning International Expert Group at the European Alcohol Policy Alliance, Vice President of the Law Section at the European Public Health Association, and member of the Technical Advisory Group on Alcohol Labelling at WHO.

This blog is a condensed version of N Gokani, ‘Booze, Bottles and Brussels: Member States’ Dilemma on Alcohol Health Warnings’ (2024) 13(2) Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 97-102. The full article is available here. An open access version is also available here.

An example of an alcohol health warning. Pictured here as used in the Yukon Study.

Alcohol and the need for effective alcohol labelling

Alcohol is a causal factor in more than 200 diseases, injuries and disabilities. Even at lower levels of consumption, alcohol is associated with increased risks of heart diseases and stroke, liver cirrhosis, cancers and foetal alcohol disorders. In the EU, alcohol consumption causes between 255,000 and 290,000 deaths per year. Beyond health, alcohol results in significant social and economic losses to individuals and society at large.

Despite negative consequences of drinking alcohol, consumer awareness of its harms is low. The World Health Organization (‘WHO’) has repeatedly called on States to provide consumers with essential information through alcohol labelling. The EU has itself acknowledged the importance of consumer alcohol information, reflecting the foundation of EU consumer protection policy that consumers can be empowered through becoming well informed.

EU level regulation of alcohol labelling

Current EU rules in Regulation 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers (‘FIC Regulation’) require alcoholic beverages with a content over 1.2% alcohol by volume (‘ABV’) to include alcohol strength on the label. Similar health-related information, including ingredients list and a nutrition declaration, which are required on the labels of most food products, are exempt for alcoholic beverages above 1.2% ABV. EU law does not require other health-related information to appear on the label.

Member State developments on alcohol labelling

Health-related warnings are not explicitly addressed under EU law and several Member States have introduced national mandatory labelling rules. These have focused on two forms on messaging: mandatory label labelling relating to the age of consumption and messaging against drinking during pregnancy.

In October 2018, Ireland signed into law its Public Health (Alcohol) Act 2018. In May 2023, Ireland signed into law as its Public Health (Alcohol) (Labelling) Regulations 2023. From May 2026, non-reusable alcohol containers will be required to include the following labelling.

While feedback from civil society organisations representing public health and consumer protection expressed strong support, industry bodies from across the globe responded opposing the measure. The feedback questioned the compatibility of the Irish Regulations, and warning labelling in general, with EU law in three key ways, which are addressed in turn below.

Legal objection 1: The Irish rules constitute a discriminatory barrier to free movement

Alcohol labelling is harmonised at EU level. National labelling rules fall within the scope of the FIC Regulation. National alcohol warning labelling rules are allowed under two different sets of rules in the FIC Regulation – depending on whether or not warning labelling would be considered to be “specifically” harmonised by the FIC Regulation.

On the one hand, health warnings are not specifically mentioned in the FIC Regulation. This suggest that health warning labelling is not “specifically” harmonised. Under this interpretation, Member States may introduce national rules. This is allowed providing that these are not contrary to general EU Treaty provisions.

On the other hand, the full list of mandatory labelling particulars (eg list of ingredients, use by date) have been listed in the FIC Regulation. This suggests that the mandatory labelling has been “specifically” harmonised. Under this interpretation, Member States may not introduce national rules unless the FIC Regulation includes a derogation. The FIC Regulation does indeed include a derogation. Article 39(1) allows Member States may adopt rules requiring additional mandatory particulars justified on public health or consumer protection grounds. This is allowed providing that Member States do not undermine the FIC Regulation and that the national rules are not contrary to general EU Treaty provisions.

Therefore, irrespective of the different interpretations of the FIC Regulation, Member States seem able to move forward with national warning labelling.

Legal objection 2: The Irish rules are not consistent with existing EU harmonisation

The FIC Regulation requires that Member States may not undermine its base protection in Article 7. Therefore, national labelling shall be “accurate”, “clear and easy to understand” and “not be misleading”.

Accurate: Taking the Irish labelling as case study, this labelling is accurate according to scientific consensus. Evidence that “Drinking alcohol causes liver disease” is well-stablished. The evidence on the dangers of drinking during pregnancy is also clear. No amount of alcohol is considered safe during pregnancy. There is also well-established evidence that “There is a direct link between alcohol and fatal cancers”. Alcohol is classified as a group 1 carcinogen by the WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer.

Clear: The requirement that information is “clear” relates to legibility and visibility. The Irish warnings meet this requirement not least as they appear against a white background, are within a black box and have a minimum size.

Not misleading: The Irish labelling is also not misleading. In line with broader consumer protection in the internal market, compliance with information rules is assessed against the behaviour of the “average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors”. This notional average is an active player in the market who reads information, has background knowledge, is critical towards information, does not take information literally, and will not be misled easily if sufficient information is available. This average consumer is likely to understand the meaning of the Irish labelling. The pregnancy warning simply advises women not to drink during pregnancy as per national health guidance. The message that “There is a direct link between alcohol and fatal cancers” communicates association with fatal cancers but does not go as far as communicating a direct causal relationship notwithstanding the well-established evidence on causation. The warning that “Drinking alcohol causes liver disease” is not misleading as liver disease occurs with even relatively lower levels of consumption.

Therefore, the Irish rules appear compatible with existing EU harmonisation.

Legal objection 3: The Irish rules are not proportionate

National alcohol labelling must also be proportionate, which it is when it is suitable and necessary to achieve its objective.

Legitimate objective:The primary objective for warning labelling is to inform consumers. It is also a part of a broader, secondary objective of reducing consumption and harms. As the Irish Regulations have been introduced under the Article 39 derogation, the objectives are limited to “the protection of public health” and “the protection of consumers”. Alcohol control clearly falls within these broad grounds as the CJEU has consistently held.

Suitability:Under the suitability limb of proportionality, it is necessary to determine whether the proposed labelling can attain its objectives of informing consumers and contributing to a reduction in consumption as part of a broader suite of measures. In respect of the primary objective, evidence demonstrates that there is a deficit of knowledge about the health consequences of alcohol consumption and labelling informs consumers. Studies show that alcohol health warnings leads to increased knowledge of health risks. Indeed, EU law already requires certain food products to be labelled with health warnings. As regards the secondary objective, evidence shows the contribution of labelling to reduction in harms and consumption.

Necessity:Under the necessity limb of proportionality, it must be determined whether a less intrusive measure can be equally effective as the proposed labelling to attain the objectives. Other measures are not equally effective. Labelling is available at both the point of purchase and point of consumption. Labelling is available on every container. It is targeted so that everyone can see the label when they see alcohol, but its visibility is in proportion to the number of containers a person consumes. It mitigates the effect of promotional marketing messaging on labelling. Ongoing costs are minimal.

Therefore, the Irish rules appear proportionate.

Moving towards effective alcohol health warning labelling

The objection raised by industry, that EU food law is a barrier to national alcohol health warning labelling rules, are demonstrably wrong. Therefore, in the absence of EU level action, Member States must take responsibility for moving forward independently. Let us hope the rest of the EU follows Ireland’s lead.

Nevertheless, EU institutions must support Member States to tackle alcohol-related harm. Tides appeared to be turning with Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, in which the Commission committed to introducing proposals on alcohol health warning labelling by the end of 2023, but the deadline passed with no action. Let us also hope the EU decides to prioritise the health of consumers over the interests of economic actors.

Celebrating the Very Best of Essex Research: Research and Impact Awards 2024

Image via Flickr

On 22 May 2024, the University of Essex showcased its top-tier research achievements at the Celebrating Excellence in Research and Impact Awards ceremony on our Colchester campus. The event honoured individuals and projects that have significantly enhanced lives worldwide through Essex’s ground-breaking work.

In a spectacular ceremony, several prestigious awards were bestowed upon research pioneers, transformative projects, and innovative technical teams. Notably, the Essex Law School secured an impressive four awards across distinct categories, underscoring our commitment to excellence in diverse fields:

Professor Lorna Woods won the award for Best Research Impact in the Faculty of Arts and Humanities for her work on online safety.

The award for Outstanding Mid-Career Researcher went to Dr Matthew Gillett for his research on the use of international criminal law to protect vulnerable groups as well as the environment from grave harms.

Dr Nikhil Gokani, who influenced the approach WHO and civil society have taken on effective laws for food and alcohol labelling, won the award for Best Research Impact by an Early Career Researcher.

Professor Yseult Marique won an award for her piece in The Conversation titled: One in five councils at risk of ‘bankruptcy’ – what happens after local authorities run out of money.

The Essex Law School has previously scooped The Conversation award thrice, in 2020, 2021 and 2023!

Essex Law School colleagues celebrating excellence at the 2024 Research & Impact Awards Ceremony

While not all of our colleagues secured awards, their brilliance shone through nominations in key categories.

Among them, Dr Koldo Casla, Dr Erin Pobjie, Dr Matthew Gillett, and Dr Sabina Garahan jointly received a nomination for Best Research Impact.

Dr Nikos Vogiatzis was nominated in the Outstanding Mid-Career Researcher category (Faculty of Arts and Humanities) for his exceptional work on European law and the award of a Senior Humboldt Fellowship at the University of Cologne.

Dr Elena Sherstoboeva was also a runner-up for the Research Visibility Champion award for her diligence in running research visibility training for our School.

And, last but not least, Melissa King, from our professional services team, was nominated for the Outstanding Research Support award.

Professor Stavroula Karapapa, Faculty Dean Research (Arts & Humanities), at the 2024 Awards Ceremony

Professor Carla Ferstman, Director of Impact at Essex Law School, commented:

“There is so much dynamism and creativity coming from our research community at ELS who are pursuing impactful research that is making a real difference in the world. Congratulations to Lorna Woods and Nikhil Gokani on this important recognition of their work and to our fabulous runners-up: Koldo, Erin, Matthew and Sabina – for highlighting the incredibly impactful work of the Human Rights Clinic.”

Snapping success at the 2024 Excellence in Research and Impact Awards

A full list of this year’s winners will be available here

The awards are open to all academics, researchers, and doctoral students each year and signal the University’s commitment to world-class research that makes a difference.

Congratulations to everyone involved!

Is International Criminal Law Ready to Accommodate Online Harm? 

By Sarah Zarmsky, Assistant Lecturer, Essex Law School

Photo from Unsplash

Historically, international criminal law (ICL) has been mainly concerned with physically violent crimes. Progressively, ICL has begun to recognise the importance of mental forms of suffering (such as for torture and genocide), but this has always been in connection with cases focused on physical harms. Recently, developments such as the proposed addition of the crime of ecocide to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court have signalled that ICL may be ready to evolve further and accommodate novel types of harm, including those perpetrated through technology.  

To explore the potential of ICL to encompass online harms, or harmful acts perpetrated through online spaces, Sarah Zarmsky, PhD Candidate and Assistant Lecturer with the Law School, recently published her article ‘Is International Criminal Law Ready to Accommodate Online Harm? Challenges and Opportunities’ with the Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ). This article stems from part of Sarah’s doctoral research on accountability for digital harms under ICL, which encompasses a broader range of harms inflicted using technology than online harms. 

This article aims to answer the understudied question of how technology can serve as the vehicle by which certain international crimes are committed or lead to new offences. It explores how current international criminal law frameworks may be able to accommodate ‘online harms’ to ensure that the law recognises the full scope of harms caused to victims, who currently may not be able to access redress through the international criminal justice system.  

Three examples of online harm that have a foreseeable nexus to the perpetration of international crimes are identified, including (a) hate speech and disinformation, (b) sharing footage of crimes via the internet, and (c) online sexual violence. The article analyses these online harms alongside similar harms that have been encompassed by core ICL crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, to assess how they might fit into existing definitions of crimes (potentially as an aggravating factor at sentencing or as a new manner of commission), or warrant the creation of an entirely new offence.  

The article concludes that the examples of online harm considered in the piece should be able to be accommodated by existing crimes, but this does not mean they should necessarily be treated the same as ‘traditional’ offences.  

For example, in the case of the spread of hate speech, this online harm could likely fall under existing definitions of persecution or incitement to genocide, or when footage of crimes is shared online, it could likely amount to an outrage upon personal dignity. Yet, the online component often exacerbates the harm—for instance, posting a video of a crime could be potentially even more humiliating than committing the same crime in a public square, where the footage is not preserved, distributed, and virtually impossible to get rid of.  

These elements should be recognised by ICL Chambers in future cases, such as during the gravity assessment of the crimes or at sentencing, to ensure that the full scale of the harm is acknowledged.  

Finally, the article emphasises that as technology will only continue to develop and serve as a vehicle for an increasing array of harms, finding ways to account for online harm and bring redress to victims should be an issue at the forefront of ICL.  

The article forms part of a forthcoming Special Issue with the JICJ edited by Dr Barrie Sander (Leiden University) and Dr Michelle Burgis-Kasthala (University of Edinburgh) titled ‘Contemporary International Criminal Law After Critique’.  

The discussions that will be sparked by this article are relevant to the explorations of engaging with ICL ‘after critique’ presented in the Special Issue, as it is important that ICL be able to recognise and adapt to new forms of harm to avoid the favouring of existing criminal harms that can reinforce traditional assumptions and stereotypes behind the law.  

The Anatomy of Impact: A Conversation with Professor Lorna Woods

Photo by Joshua Hoehne on Unsplash

By Professor Carla Ferstman, Director of Impact, Essex Law School

As academics, we conduct research for all sorts of reasons. We seek to advance knowledge and innovation in the areas in which we specialise, and we try to make connections with research being done in other disciplines for the purpose of enhancing our understanding of and contributing to address cross-cutting, complex challenges.

Academic research is increasingly being applied outside of academia to foster external impacts in our communities and societies. Research-led teaching can also foster the opportunities for cutting-edge, student learning.

The UK Research Excellence Framework values world-leading research that is rigorous, significant and original. It also encourages and rewards research that generates impact, which it understands as “an effect on, change, or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia” (REF2021).

Impactful research is particularly relevant and important for the discipline of law, where colleagues’ work can lead to changes in how justice is perceived and how access to justice can be better achieved. Academic research in law has led to and influenced the direction of law reform and academic findings have also been applied authoritatively in court judgments. Legal research has also led to the development of new policies, and regulatory frameworks in the UK and internationally.

Despite the importance many legal academics place on generating impact, the route to impact is not obvious. Achieving impactful academic research defies a one-size-fits-all formula, though certain key pointers are invaluable:

First, impactful research is generated by academics who produce excellent, groundbreaking research.

Second, academics should be mindful of who (e.g., community stakeholders, policy-makers, decision-makers) would benefit from knowing about the research and should develop a strategy to ensure they effectively disseminate their findings.

Third, academics seeking to generate impactful research should be actively engaging with those who can benefit from their research, adapting their approach based on stakeholder needs and circumstances.  

Learning from example

Academics can glean wisdom from exemplary models. And there is no better example than Professor Lorna Woods, whose research contributed significantly to the Online Safety Bill (now Online Safety Act 2023) and led to her being awarded an OBE for services to internet safety policy.

I sat down with Professor Woods to get a clearer understanding of her trajectory – how she got from A to B to C (or indeed, from B to A to F to C), to better appreciate the time her ideas took to percolate and the challenges she faced along the way.

I wanted to understand whether her research was picked up by government by happenstance, by carefully, plodded planning, or some other combination. I also wanted to know whether there was any magic formula she could share to generating impactful research.

Lorna qualified as a solicitor and worked in the early 1990s for a London city firm, where she was exposed to a variety of areas of law, including international trade, competition, and commercial law. She began to work with two of the partners on matters involving regulation, intellectual property, and media. She happened to be at the firm when many developments  in the law occurred, such as the Broadcasting Act 1990, up-dates in data protection rules, and other changes as a result of growing public access to the internet.

This quickly developed into a specialism related to technology. “The work was really interesting. It wasn’t just the typical due diligence or deals management work that one often received in a corporate solicitor’s firm, there was a space to think and a space to have your say”.

Also, during this time, Lorna did some consulting work for the European Commission in Eastern European countries following the political changes in the early 1990s, focused on media freedom and public service broadcasting, which involved new thinking about the rights of the public audience that had not yet been theorised.

Lorna left the firm after about five years when, as often happens, she began to take on a more supervisory role, with some of the most interesting pieces of work being delegated to more junior colleagues. She pursued an LL.M degree at the University of Edinburgh (legal theory and human rights, with a dissertation on federalism and the European Union) and began to apply for academic roles. She secured a position in 1994 at Sheffield and began teaching EU and public law.

The Eureka moment or more of a slow-burner?

Gradually Lorna’s research began to drift back to media law and data protection, incorporating areas she had been studying around human rights, public speech, surveillance, and the rights of journalists, but with her own take. She recalled that “A lot of people were talking about journalists’ rights, but I was focussed on the rights of the companies who were transmitting; an ‘essential facilities’ argument but approached from a rights perspective. I also started looking at these issues from the perspectives of EU law and the free movement of cultural standards [the rights of the audience] rather than simply as an issue of freedom of expression.”

Central to this was the idea that there were different actors in an information environment – the speakers and the audience, and something in the middle which had more to do with the platform, that is not really seen or thought about. The question Lorna had was whether these entailed separate rights or were all part of a unified right to information.

In 2000, Lorna was collaborating with Professor Jackie Harrison at Sheffield and they began researching new media and media regulation, and again, this is where she conceptualised further her thoughts on the rights of the audience not only to have access to information, but to information that was reasonably reliable, and where possible, to a diversity and plurality of sources.

This also connected to her thinking about how to find information on the internet, who curates what we can find and what responsibilities may be attached to the curation. The flip side to this was considering the nature of states’ positive obligations to provide a safe online environment. Lorna also began to explore issues around usergenerated content.

In response to the growing awareness of how female politicians and activists were being targeted on Twitter (now X), and the notoriety of the abuse faced by Caroline Criado Perez and Walthamstow MP Stella Creasy, Lorna started looking at what controls were in place, and began to consider the gaps in regulation and how they could best be addressed.

At the time, she observed that politicians had embraced Twitter, amplifying their influence while also making them more accessible and exposed. The platform facilitated direct communications between everyone on the network, including with unsavoury individuals who were using the platform as a form of abuse. This was fuelled by anonymous accounts, hashtags that allow you to jump on the bandwagon, and little seeming moderation at that stage. There were many instances of public-facing women receiving rape and death threats.

In consequence, there were several instances in which users were being charged in the UK under section 127 of the Communications Act – a low-grade offence which criminalises the sending, via a “public electronic communications network”, of a message which is “grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”. But it was never clear to Lorna that using the criminal law was the best solution to the problem.

The campaign for law reform begins to take shape

Around 2015, Lorna became aware that the then Labour MP Anna Turley MP was developing a private member’s bill:  the Malicious Communications (Social Media) Bill. Someone whom Lorna had met in an unrelated capacity – “this is just really a feature of when you work in a certain area, you meet people linked to that area. And progressively, your army of contacts comes back to help” – William Perrin, managed to get her in the door to meet the MP.

Together, Lorna and William helped to draft the Bill. The goal was to give users better tools (user empowerment features and functionalities) so that they could filter and triage incoming content, at least as a starting point for improving the online environment. Their advice (which was taken on board) was not to remove platform immunity for third-party content; they recognised that the platform providers were offering an important service worth protecting.

Part of the rationale for this was the connections they saw between internet platform providers and telecoms providers: “If you were to hold a telecoms provider responsible for anything communicated on the service, they would become very cautious and ultimately it would shut down the service.  So, there was a need for caution.” Ultimately the Bill did not progress because private members’ bills rarely do but they operate to bring matters to the attention of the Government and can be part of a campaign for change.

Subsequently, the Government published a Green Paper on internet safety in 2017, where significant concerns were raised. This was the era of Cambridge Analytica and misinformation, but there were also concerns about child pornography and online bullying, and the algorithms prioritising content to vulnerable users stemming from the tragic Molly Russell case.  The Green Paper seemed to revisit the recommendation to remove (or significantly restrict) platform immunity for third-party content, which Lorna and William did not think was the best approach, for the reasons already stated.

There was a need to conceive of the problem at the systems level, rather than merely focusing on isolated items of content. For example, the scale of the problem invariably was not about the individual offensive posts but that the content was quickly able to go viral without appropriate controls, aided by functions like the “like” button, and the availability of anonymous, disposable accounts.

Similarly, the recommender algorithm which optimised certain posts for engagement tended to privilege the most irrational, emotional posts which were more likely to promote hatred or cause offence. Making small changes to these kinds of features and investing more in customer response, could significantly improve online safety.  Thus, according to Lorna, there was a certain recklessness in the product design that needed to be addressed – this was the genesis of the idea of a statutory duty of care. 

Paws for thought: remembering Faith, Lorna’s beloved cat who ‘Zoom-bombed’ video calls during lockdown and contributed much to debates on online safety

The statutory duty of care

Lorna and William produced a series of blogs and papers outlining this position, and the need for such reforms was also underscored by Lorna during an oral evidence session at the House of Lords inquiry into the regulation of the internet. The Carnegie UK Trust stepped up to champion Lorna and William’s work, facilitating its progress.

The UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) invited Lorna to give a briefing, and it became clear that there was some confusion. The DCMS had been under the impression that the conditionality of the platform immunity amounted to a statutory duty of care. Consequently, part of what Lorna and Will tried to explain was how their proposal was compatible with the principle of platform or intermediary immunity. The proposal was not seeking to impose liability on the platform for user content but instead, focused on requiring platforms to ensure product design met their duty of care to users. These discussions with DCMS continued, and progressively intensified.

The White Paper which was ultimately released in April 2019 clearly articulated that “The government will establish a new statutory duty of care to make companies take more responsibility for the safety of their users and tackle harm caused by content or activity on their services,” and outlined what that duty of care would look like and how it would be regulated.  

Changes within the Tory leadership ultimately delayed progress. There were also concerns raised by some of those in the free speech lobby who saw parts of what was being proposed as censorship.  Lorna’s background in freedom of speech helped her respond to those concerns: “I was concerned that freedom of speech was being used as a slogan. When you look at any right and you look at it in isolation, you are then implicitly privileging it. And here, it was important not just to consider the rights of the ‘speaker’ but the rights of all the other users as well, some of whom are extremely vulnerable.” 

These points align with what the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression explained in her 2023 report on gendered disinformation, who notes, citing Lorna’s submission, that “Systemic regulation, which emphasizes ‘architecture over takedown’, allows for more proportionate responses and is likely to be better aligned with freedom of expression standards.”

Certainly, companies were lobbying in other directions and the Act reflects some corporate compromises, such as the need for the duty of care to be applied proportionately, to account for the different levels of resources of the regulated company. But there were powerful counter-arguments, and the NSPCC and other organisations were effective allies particularly on the need for clear duties of care in relation to child users. The Daily Telegraph also ran an important campaign on the legislation. The Government at one point sought to restrict the Act to concerns about children, so this became part of the campaign to maintain a focus also on harm to adults (unfortunately only limited protections were maintained). There are other parts of the Act which differ from what Lorna and William had proposed, such as dividing up the regulatory framework by reference to certain types of conduct. Inevitably there were compromises.

The Act as adopted envisages that the communications regulator Ofcom will produce guidance and codes which will explain what internet platforms must do in order to operate in the United Kingdom. There are ongoing consultations regarding these texts. Once the guidance and codes are in place, companies will be given a period (three months) to align their practice to comply with the requirements. Thereafter, the duties of care will become binding.

Some of the companies appear to be arguing that a duty of care is too vague a standard, however this is hard to accept, given that it is a recognised legal standard. The goal for Lorna and others is therefore to ensure that the duty of care standard is made operational in such a way that it provides clear and adequate protections; it should be more than a ‘tick the box’ exercise.

I asked Lorna how this legislation would tackle the activities of companies operating outside of the UK, but with impacts in the UK. She explained that parts of the Act have extraterritorial effect, to the extent that company activities are directed at or have impacts in the UK. Some companies have introduced policies for different geographical regions to address the requirements of national legislation, so this is a possibility for multinational internet platforms accessible to UK users.  

I also discussed with Lorna whether she believed individuals like Molly Russell would be more effectively safeguarded now that the Online Safety Act is in force. She explained that Molly would not be better off today, because the guidance and codes are not yet in place. “Maybe in a year’s time, she would probably be better protected, as a child. I think an 18-year-old Molly would be sadly let down by the regime, which should be more robust.”

Given the clear synergies with her work on the Act, Lorna is also progressing with work on online gender-based violence, and some work on gender-misinformation, incel and extremism. As she looks deeper into these critical areas, it becomes evident that her ongoing endeavours reveal new challenges and fresh avenues for advocacy and change.

Building Better Communities? Examining How Section 106 Agreements Shape Local Development

Photo by Breno Assis on Unsplash

By Dr Edward Mitchell, Essex Law School

Picture a city with an acute housing shortage. Now, envision a plot of land formerly used for industrial purposes, now vacant following a fire that razed most of its buildings two decades ago. Next, imagine a property development initiative set to deliver 150 shiny new houses and 100 smart apartments on that very site. Finally, consider that the project also includes plans for landscaped stretches of open space and a dedicated area earmarked for on-site biodiversity protection.

In this fictional setting, 250 new homes sound great. The open space and the bio-diversity protection area sound good too. But let’s also imagine some potential adverse effects of the development. Perhaps there are many families in acute housing need in the local area who will be priced out of the development. Maybe local primary and secondary schools are already oversubscribed. Perhaps traffic crawls along local roads at the pace of a sedated snail.

Can a local authority compel the developer carrying out this type of development project to mitigate these adverse effects?

In a recent article published in the journal Current Legal Problems, I explore this complex issue.

My article develops ideas I discussed in a lecture I gave in December 2023 as part of UCL’s flagship Current Legal Problems lecture series and expands upon work I previously discussed in a blog on the role of contracts in contemporary town planning. In my lecture and blog post, I highlighted tensions in current planning practice that arise when local authorities rely on private developers to provide public goods that the local authority has identified as important.

UCL Current Legal Problems Lecture: Contracting in the public interest? Re-examining contract in contemporary town planning processes

I build on my earlier work in my latest article by investigating how local authorities and developers create ‘planning obligations’ to mitigate the potentially adverse effects of property development on local communities and on local infrastructure needs. The planning obligations that I discuss are made by local authorities and developers by agreement pursuant to section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The article asks important questions about the detailed and highly intricate framework of duties, rights and powers that these ‘section 106 agreements’ create.

I base my analysis in the article on two case study developments. Examining the section 106 agreements created for these developments enables me to provide rich insights into this complex area of legal and planning practice.

I summarise my findings below.

Finding 1: A limited role in ordering ‘private’ relations

In most property development projects, the developer will seek to obtain planning permission by applying to the planning part of a local authority. Before the local authority grants planning permission, the local authority and the developer will usually identify potential negative effects of the proposed development, and the two parties will negotiate planning obligations to be secured in a section 106 agreement. These obligations might aim to mitigate the development’s negative impacts through the provision, by the developer, of funding for local schools, affordable housing, and local amenities, amongst other things.

When a developer and a local authority enter into a section 106 agreement, the developer should perform the planning obligations and the local authority can enforce them.

The first key issue that my article considers is the nature of the ‘private’ bilateral contractual relations between a developer and a local authority that a section 106 agreement creates.

I ask an important question about this in my article: How do section 106 agreements contribute to a development culture in which private developers do not always perform their public policy obligations?

In the pursuit of answers to this question, I examine the content of the obligations in the section 106 agreements created for my case study developments, I scrutinise monitoring arrangements and I investigate enforcement powers.

In the article, I explain the first key insight from my case studies as follows:

My [case studies] show how these agreements consist of administrative clauses that appear to create an intricate framework of rights, responsibilities, duties and powers relating to the performance of planning obligations. But I also showed how the detail, complexity and apparent rigidity of the obligations in the agreements belies the one-sidedness and the haphazardness of these arrangements. This is important, and suggests that these agreements are ill-equipped to serve as effective instruments for ordering the ‘private’ relations between a [local authority] and a developer.

Finding 2: New questions about the ‘expressive force’ of section 106 agreements

A further crucial finding that my article presents relates to the public-facing work that section 106 agreements do.

My second case study involved a development proposed for a site where ownership of the land was divided amongst multiple unwilling sellers. The local authority had granted a developer planning permission for that development and, to enable that development to take place, had agreed to use its compulsory purchase powers to acquire the entire site.

The land acquisition context of this development enables me to analyse the operation of section 106 agreements as a justificatory device local authorities and developers deploy at planning inquiries convened to consider the use of compulsory purchase powers.

Alongside this, another striking aspect of my second case study development was the way that the section 106 agreement addressed local policies relating to affordable housing provision.

In my article, I ask a second important research question: How does the presence of ostensibly binding promises in section 106 agreements facilitate the exercise of regulatory decision-making in planning and property development processes?

By examining my second case study development, I conclude in my article as follows:

My discussion here presents new findings showing how these agreements can have a powerful expressive force in signalling a commitment to public policy interests that ‘de-risks’ these contentious land acquisition and affordable housing issues for developers and local authorities (Legacy and others 2023). But the crucial point in this section is that these agreements do this despite the emptiness of the commitments that they sometimes contain. These findings demonstrate how planning scholarship needs to look beyond the impression of binding force that a section 106 agreement creates to scrutinise the way that these agreements reinforce uneven outcomes and marginalise certain interests.

Photo by Maximillian Conacher on Unsplash

Finding 3: The need for greater transparency and community participation

My second case study provides an opportunity to examine a section 106 agreement containing developer obligations designed to discharge a local authority’s public sector equality duty.

The third research question that my article asks relates to this public sector equality duty. I ask: How do local authorities manage the implementation of novel developer obligations designed to shape broader community relations?

In my article, I describe my findings in response to this question as follows:

[Making] a section 106 agreement containing developer obligations designed to discharge a local authority’s public sector equalities duty … is an innovative and under-explored way of using a section 106 agreement, so this part of the paper provides a rare insight into the more unusual obligations in these agreements and into the practical challenges local authorities can face when monitoring the implementation of novel planning devices.

My findings also enable me to explain how equalities considerations created a focal point for opposition to an apparently settled development trajectory.

I argue that this highlights the need for greater transparency and public involvement in setting and implementing planning obligations.

Agenda for further research

Planning, public law and contract law scholars will find helpful insights in my article about the diverse and multilayered roles contractual arrangements play in current regulatory practices.

But while my article highlights various problems with the current use of section 106 agreements, understanding how local authorities might more effectively compel developers to mitigate the impacts of property development requires further research.

Here are some key areas where a greater understanding of section 106 agreements and their use might enable insights that would inform better practice:

  • How might planning law and planning practice enable greater transparency and public involvement in setting and implementing planning obligations?
  • How do planners and lawyers gather and use the monitoring information about developer behaviour theoretically made accessible through the section 106 agreements studied in my article?
  • How do planners and lawyers use the enforcement powers contained in section 106 agreements, and could they use those powers differently?

New communications offences enacted by the Online Safety Act 2023

Photo by Ravi Sharma on Unsplash

Dr. Alexandros Antoniou, Essex Law School

The Online Safety Act 2023 (OSA) introduced a range of measures intended to improve online safety in the UK, including duties on internet platforms about having systems and processes in place to manage illegal and harmful content on their sites. On 31 January 2024, Part 10 of the Act came into effect, introducing a series of new criminal offences which represent a significant leap forward in tackling complex challenges surrounding online communications safety.

Section 179 of the OSA establishes the criminal offence of sending false communications and seeks to target, among others, internet trolls. It is now deemed an offence if an individual (a) sends a message containing knowingly false information; (b) intends, at the time of sending, to cause non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience; and (c) lacks a reasonable excuse for sending the message. Recognised news publishers and broadcasters are exempt. The offence does not apply to public screenings of cinema films either. It can be committed by individuals outside the UK if they are habitually resident in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland. Penalties include imprisonment for up to six months, a fine, or both. It is hoped the new offence will help clamp down on disinformation and election interference online.

Section 181 establishes the criminal offence of sending threatening communications. This is committed when an individual sends a message containing a threat of death, serious harm (e.g. bodily injury, rape, assault by penetration), or serious financial loss, with the intent to instil fear in the recipient that the threat will be carried out (whether by the sender or someone else). In cases of threats involving financial loss, a defence is available if the threat was used to support a reasonable demand, and the sender reasonably believed it was an appropriate way to reinforce that demand. This offence applies to individuals residing in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, even if the sender is located outside the UK. Penalties include up to five years of imprisonment, a fine, or both. In March 2024, Essex law enforcement achieved a significant milestone by obtaining one of the earliest convictions under the new OSA, resulting in an eight-month jail sentence for Karn Statham. Statham harassed a woman by sending threatening messages and making repeated visits to her address after being instructed to cease contact.

A new criminal offence under section 183, dubbed “Zach’s law”, aims to protect people from “epilepsy trolling”. The campaign against such conduct began when eight-year-old Zach, who has epilepsy, was raising funds for the Epilepsy Society. Trolls inundated the Society’s profile with images and GIFs meant to induce seizures in people with epilepsy. While Zach was unharmed, others with the condition reported seizures after engaging with the fundraiser online. The Act creates the offence of deliberately sending or showing flashing images to individuals with epilepsy with the intent to cause harm, defined as inducing a seizure, alarm, or distress. Particular conditions (specified in the Act) must be met before a conviction is secured, both in respect to sending and showing flashing images electronically. Recognised news publishers, broadcasters, public screenings of cinema films as well as healthcare professionals cannot be guilty of this offence (which can similarly be committed by individuals outside the UK if they are habitually resident in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland). Penalties include imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both.

Moreover, section 184 outlaws encouraging or assisting serious self-harm. To be guilty of this offence, an individual must perform an act intended to encourage or assist serious self-harm in another person, whether through direct communication, publication or sending (or giving) items with stored electronic data. Serious self-harm encompasses actions leading to grievous bodily harm, including acts of omission such as encouraging someone to neglect their health regimen. The identity of the person harmed need not be known to the offender. The offence can occur regardless of whether self-harm is carried out and it is irrelevant who created the content in question (it is the sending that matters). The offence is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both, and likewise, it applies to individuals habitually resident in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, even if they are outside the UK.

Cyber-flashing on dating apps, AirDrop and other platforms will also result in perpetrators facing up to two years in prison. Section 187 of the Act introduces a new offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 pertaining to the sending of photographs or films of a person’s genitals to another individual. A person (A) is deemed to commit the offence if they intentionally send or provide a photo or video of another person’s genitals to another individual (B) under the following conditions: either A intends for B to view the genitals and experience alarm, distress, or humiliation; or A sends or provides such material with the aim of obtaining sexual gratification and is reckless as to whether B will experience alarm, distress, or humiliation. “Sending” covers sending through any means, including electronic methods, showing it to another person, or placing it for someone to find. A conviction for this offence could also lead to inclusion on the sex offenders’ register. In February 2024, an Essex Police team secured the UK’s first cyber-flashing conviction, with Nicholas Hawkes pleading guilty to sending explicit images via WhatsApp to cause distress. On 19 March 2024, Hawkes was sentenced to 66 weeks in prison. He was also made subject to a restraining order for 10 years and a Sexual Harm Prevention Order for 15 years.

Finally, the OSA repeals the legislation first introduced to tackle ‘revenge porn’ offences (sections 33-35 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015) and introduces a set of intimate image sharing offences. Specifically, section 188 of the OSA introduces a new base offence of sharing of intimate images without consent, carrying a penalty of imprisonment for up to six months. This applies when an individual intentionally shares an image portraying another person in an intimate context without their consent and without a reasonable belief in consent. Two more serious offences are established on top of that, both reflecting the offender’s higher culpability and carrying greater penalties: namely (a) intentionally causing alarm, distress, or humiliation to the person in the image; and (b) seeking sexual gratification from the act (these are outlined in sections 66B(2) and (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003). Threatening to share an intimate image of a person has also been made an offence where the perpetrator either intends to cause fear that the threat will be carried out or acts recklessly in doing so (this is found under section 66B(4) of the aforementioned 2003 Act). The new offences also fall under the sexual offender notification requirements. These new intimate image offences are also designed to tackle “deepfakes” and “down-blousing” (i.e. capturing images typically of a person’s chest area, from a downward angle, often without their knowledge or consent). They also come with various exemptions (outlined under section 66C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003), e.g. where the photograph or film involves a child and is of a kind normally shared among family and friends.

While there is some overlap between existing offences, the new offences consolidate previous ones or address gaps. For example, the intimate image sharing offence widens the meaning of the photographs or films, from “private sexual” to “intimate” and makes it easier for those caught sharing such content online without the other person’s consent to be prosecuted, as it removes the requirement for any harm to be intended to the subject of the photograph or film. The updated guidance of the Crown Prosecution Service aims to delineate the appropriate charge for each circumstance. The introduction of the new offences is anticipated to fortify protections against online misconduct.


This article was first published on the IRIS Merlin database and is reproduced here with permission and thanks.