Prof. Daly (Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa) talked about the fresh framework his book offers for understanding the core features of contemporary administrative law and distinguished guests commented on the book’s contribution:
Prof. John Bell (Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Cambridge) identified several questions that a comparative lawyer interested in European legal systems might have in reading this book.
Prof. Peter Cane (Senior Research Fellow of Christ’s College, University of Cambridge and Emeritus Professor, Australian National University College of Law) remarked that ‘divergence is just as important as convergence when it comes to either explaining or understanding administrative law across the common law world’. He pointed out that Prof. Daly has done an excellent job in tracing the convergences.
Prof. Giacinto della Cananea (Bocconi University) described Prof. Daly’s work as ‘a healthy antidote to the recurring view that administrative law is no more than a deviation from the (supposedly) orthodox rules of law’. He made a series of useful points on Prof. Daly’s comparative approach to Common Law jurisdictions and continental European legal systems.
Prof. Daly’s response to the comments of the esteemed scholars can be accessed on the webpage of the British Association of Comparative Law here.
By Dr. Koldo Casla, Lecturer in Law and the Director of the Human Rights Centre Clinic
In the 2008 case of McCann v UK, which concerned the eviction of a family renting a house from a local authority in England, the European Court of Human Rights established that:
“(T)he loss of one’s home is a most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for the home. Any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal”.
Para 50, emphasis added
In a decision on admissibility ten years later, FJM v UK, the Court restricted the principle above to evictions in the public sector. Despite the wording in McCann, the proportionality test would not really apply to any person, but only to tenants in the same situation McCann found himself in, namely, social/public housing tenants.
In my new article in European Human Rights Law Review, I argue that the European Court of Human Rights should reconsider the position expressed in FJM v UK, and establish that evictions with no proportionality test are contrary to the right to home of Article 8 ECHR, also in the private rental sector
In FJM v UK, the European Court went as far as to say that, if tenants were entitled to require national judges to examine the proportionality of an eviction before ordering the possession of their home, ‘the resulting impact on the private rental sector would be wholly unpredictable and potentially very damaging’ (para 43, emphasis added).
This article shows that this need not be the case, and that in fact before reaching such a conclusion the European Court should have examined European comparative practice and national legal orders, as well as other human rights obligations. This article makes the case for a proportionality assessment of all evictions, irrespective of public or private ownership. The scope of the margin of appreciation requires an analysis of the common ground that may exist in European comparative practice and in light of other international human rights obligations accepted in the continent. The social function of homeownership provides the ground to achieve a better balance between the right to private property, the right to private and family life, and the right to housing.
Neither Article 11 ICESCR (on the right to adequate housing) nor Article 8 ECHR (on the right to home as part of private and family life) would give tenants a blank check to stop paying their rent or to break the lease in any other way. And giving judges the power to assess the proportionality of an eviction in the private rental sector would not fix all the housing problems. But it would be an important first step towards a more balanced relationship between landlords and tenants.
By Louise Millescamps, University of Essex, School of Law
L’ auteur tient à remercier Dr Laure Sauve, Eugénie Duval et Dr Xavier Aurey pour leurs précieux commentaires sur les versions précédentes de cet article.
Le 16 octobre 2021, David Peace, un malade en phase terminale affirme que «la législation anglaise l’a abandonné». Diagnostiqué en 2019 d’une maladie affectant sa motricité, ce Londonien a voyagé en Suisse afin de pouvoir bénéficier d’une fin de vie digne et sans crainte de douleurs «intolérables». La législation anglaise refuse, en effet, aux personnes en fin de vie de recourir au suicide assisté. En France, la mort assistée est aussi illégale. Le 5 février 2022, un homme français de 55 ans a été arrêté après avoir assisté sa mère de 94 ans dans sa mort. Il a expliqué souhaiter mettre fin à la «situation de plus en plus indigne de sa mère». Selon son avocat, ce fils a été le «témoin d’un processus de déshumanisation» et n’a fait qu’agir à la demande de son parent.
Il est intéressant de comparer ces deux pays qui refusent la légalisation de la mort assistée afin de mieux comprendre les arguments des législateurs. En effet, en France comme en Angleterre, la mort assistée (qui englobe le suicide assisté et l’euthanasie) est réprimée pénalement. Le suicide assisté est une pratique par laquelle le patient met fin à sa vie grâce à des moyens ou grâce à un environnement particulier qui lui ont été fournis par une tierce personne. En France, il est associé à la non-assistance à personne en danger puisque l’on considère que la personne tierce n’a pas porté secours à une personne en détresse. Cette personne tierce peut être condamnée à 5 ans d’emprisonnement et 75 000 € d’amende. En Angleterre, cette pratique est condamnée par le Suicide Act 1961 qui par sa section 2 condamne toute action encourageant ou assistant au suicide. La peine, beaucoup plus sévère, peut aller jusqu’à 14 ans d’emprisonnement.
L’euthanasie est quant à elle une pratique par laquelle une personne tierce met elle-même fin à la vie du patient avec son consentement par l’injection d’un médicament pas exemple. En France, elle est associée à l’homicide volontaire qui est puni de 30 ans de réclusion criminelle (Article 221-1 du code pénal), tandis qu’en Angleterre, l’euthanasie est associée à un meurtre ou un homicide involontaire, passable d’un emprisonnement à vie. De ce fait, les personnes euthanasiant un patient en fin de vie risquent, en Angleterre, l’emprisonnement à vie.
L’objectif de cet article est donc de présenter l’évolution du droit français et anglais sur la fin de vie (I) ainsi que les arguments mis en avant par les législateurs pour refuser de légaliser la mort assistée (II).
I. L’évolution limitée de la loi anglaise et française
L’évolution de la législation française et anglaise est partagée entre un refus de légaliser la mort assistée et une volonté d’améliorer la prise en charge de la fin de vie. En France (1), comme en Angleterre (2), des affaires ont permis de grands changements dans la loi: la reconnaissance des directives anticipées et la possibilité de refuser l’hydratation et l’alimentation artificielle. De plus, la France est le premier pays à légaliser la sédation longue et continue, permettant une reconnaissance implicite de l’euthanasie passive.
1. Vers une tolérance de l’euthanasie passive en France
En France, la première affaire qui a influencé la législation fut l’affaire Vincent Humbert en 2003. Vincent Humbert a été victime en 2000 d’un accident de la route le rendant tétraplégique, muet et aveugle. En 2003, sa mère, aidée par un médecin, provoqua la mort de son fils. Ceci a poussé le législateur à adopter la loi Leonetti le 22 avril 2005 relative aux droits des malades et à la fin de la vie. Cette loi a parachevé les soins palliatifs grâce aux directives anticipées, c’est-à-dire la possibilité pour une personne d’exprimer dans un document écrit ses vœux quant aux décisions médicales à prendre en fin de vie, document qui doit être renouvelé tous les trois ans. Cette loi a également interdit l’obstination déraisonnable ou «acharnement thérapeutique». Il s’agit de soins inutiles, disproportionnés ou ayant pour seul but le maintien artificiel de la vie (Article 2 de la Loi n° 2016-87 du 2 février 2016 créant de nouveaux droits en faveur des malades et des personnes en fin de vie). Cette interdiction permet d’introduire un droit au «laisser mourir» permettant au patient qui refuse tout traitement médical de voir sa volonté respectée par le corps médical même si ce choix met sa vie en danger. Cela signifie par exemple qu’un patient souhaitant arrêter ses traitements médicaux, comme un médicament permettant de soulager les douleurs, peut le demander afin de précipiter la fin de sa vie.
Une deuxième affaire qui a permis une évolution de la loi française est l’affaire Vincent Lambert. Après un accident de la route, cet homme s’est retrouvé dans un coma végétatif. En 2013, c’est-à-dire six ans après l’accident, le médecin chargé de s’occuper de Vincent Lambert conclut à un acharnement déraisonnable et décide d’arrêter l’alimentation artificielle de Vincent Lambert. Cependant, les parents de Monsieur Lambert s’opposent à cette décision du médecin et il s’ensuit une longue procédure judiciaire. En 2019, les traitements de Vincent Lambert sont arrêtés et il décède quelques semaines plus tard. C’est à la suite de cette affaire très médiatisée que le législateur adopte la loi Claeys Leonetti du 2 février 2016 créant de nouveaux droits en faveur des malades et des personnes en fin de vie. Selon cette loi, le médecin droit respecter la volonté du patient exprimée dans des directives anticipées et, la nutrition et l’hydratation artificielles constituent des traitements médicaux qui peuvent être arrêtés (article L. 1110-5-1 alinéa 2 du code de la santé publique). Enfin, cette loi a aussi introduit la possibilité pour le patient de demander la sédation profonde et continue jusqu’à son décès, renforçant le droit « au laisser mourir » du patient. Avec ce dernier élément, le législateur semble tolérer l’euthanasie passive même s’il estime que l’intention de la sédation profonde et continue n’est pas de donner la mort mais de soulager la douleur alors qu’une mort est imminente et inévitable. Ainsi hâtée, la mort est justifiée par le soulagement de douleurs insupportables.
Ainsi, le législateur français a essayé d’étendre le plus possible la notion de soins palliatifs dans la loi afin d’assurer une mort digne aux patients en fin de vie sans pour autant légaliser l’euthanasie et le suicide assisté.
2.En Angleterre, le refus du législateur de légaliser tout type de mort assistée
En Angleterre, le Mental Capacity Act de 2005 permet aux patients de recourir aux directives anticipées ainsi que de demander la cessation des traitements médicaux qui comprennent l’hydratation et l’alimentation.
Les mesures sur les directives anticipées ont été introduites à la suite de l’affaire Re C [1]. Dans cette affaire, s’est posée la question de la capacité du patient atteint de schizophrénie paranoïaque à donner ou retirer son consentement pour un traitement médical. Cette capacité à refuser un traitement médical a donc fait écho aux situations des personnes en fin de vie qui deviennent incapables d’exprimer leur consentement à cause d’une maladie. La Law Commission a donc décidé d’introduire la possibilité pour le patient de recourir aux directives anticipées.
De plus, le législateur a rejeté trois projets de loi qui auraient permis un pas vers la légalisation de la mort assistée. Ces projets de loi sont intervenus notamment après l’affaire Tony Nicklinson. En 2008, Tony Nicklinson a subi un accident vasculaire cérébral qui l’a laissé paralysé et muet. Il vivait un cauchemar et souhaitait mettre fin à sa vie. Cependant, il ne pouvait pas le faire sans aide. Il a donc demandé en 2012 à la Supreme Court de l’autoriser à mettre fin à sa vie avec l’aide d’un médecin ainsi que de reconnaître l’incompatibilité de cette loi avec ses droits fondamentaux. Suite au rejet de ses demandes, Tony Nicklinson a refusé de s’alimenter et est décédé peu après. Si l’un des projets de loi évoqués ci-dessus avait été adopté, des personnes dans la même situation que M. Nicklinson aurait pu bénéficier d’une assistance dans la mort. En 2012, une ancienne députée du Parlement écossais a présenté un projet intitulé «the Assisted Suicide (Scotland) Bill (2013)». S’il avait été adopté, ce projet aurait permis à une personne atteinte d’une maladie en phase terminale de mettre fin à ses jours grâce à un médicament prescrit par le médecin. Le projet a été rejeté dès la première étape du débat. Deux autres projets de loi similaires ont été examinés et rejetés en 2014 et 2015.
En France, comme en Angleterre, les lois ont été fortement influencées par différentes affaires très médiatisées. Cependant, les législateurs anglais et français refusent toujours de légaliser l’euthanasie et le suicide assisté. Ils justifient notamment leur refus en arguant que les soins palliatifs et la mort assistée poursuivent des objectifs différents: les premiers ont pour but de soulager la douleur du patient tandis que la seconde vise à provoquer le décès du malade en fin de vie.
Photo by the National Cancer Institute on Unsplash
Les arguments des législateurs anglais et français pour justifier leur refus de légaliser la mort assistée
Les arguments du législateur anglais sont similaires à ceux du législateur français et sont repris dans les différents débats parlementaires lorsqu’un nouveau projet de loi tendant à la légalisation de la mort assistée est en discussion. Il existe trois arguments principaux pour appuyer le refus de la légalisation de cette pratique. Les législateurs font d’abord valoir un manque de clarté problématique pour les personnes qui seraient concernées par la mort assistée (1). Ils estiment ensuite qu’il faudrait réformer la prise en charge du patient en fin de vie plutôt que de légaliser la mort (2). Enfin, est mis en avant l’argument selon lequel le choix du patient sur sa fin de vie comprend également la possibilité de changer d’avis, ce que l’acte irréversible qu’est la mort ne permet pas (3).
1. Un manque de clarté des propositions de loi dangereux pour les patients en fin de vie
Les législateurs français et anglais ont avancé que les propositions de loi étaient trop vagues. Par exemple, la proposition de loi de 2012 présentée en Ecosse ne possédait pas de définition permettant de différencier l’euthanasie du suicide assisté. Les projets de loi étaient alors inadéquats pour le patient qui souhaite prendre contrôle de la fin de sa vie. En effet, le malade en fin de vie souhaitant mourir par sa main (suicide assisté) mais qui décède par une le fait d’un médecin (euthanasie), ne prend pas contrôle de sa fin de vie comme il le souhaiterait.
De plus, ce manque de clarté aurait pesé sur le corps médical qui se serait chargé de cette mort assistée incertaine. En effet, il est nécessaire que le médecin soit soumis à des règles très clairement établies, lesquelles garantiraient le consentement du patient de recourir à la mort assistée, et permettraient au médecin de ne pas être jugé pour un acte qu’il pensait être autorisé. Enfin, le manque de clarté des projets de loi aurait également eu des répercussions pour les juges et avocats qui auraient eu de nombreuses difficultés pour apprécier si une affaire concernant la mort assistée pouvait être jugée criminellement. Considérées comme étant trop peu précises par les législateurs anglais et français, ces derniers ont préféré ne pas adopter ces propositions.
2. Une meilleure prise en charge de la fin de vie du patient
Un autre argument avancé par les législateurs français et anglais est qu’il est nécessaire non pas de légaliser la mort assistée, mais de placer les malades en fin de vie dans une meilleure situation.
Pour eux, il s’agit de réformer la prise en charge du patient en fin de vie et d’alléger du mieux possible sa souffrance sans toutefois avoir recours à la mort. En effet, selon les législateurs, avec une fin de vie sans douleur et un meilleur accompagnement du malade dans son décès, la légalisation de la mort assistée deviendrait superflue.
Les législateurs français et anglais, dissuadés par le caractère irréversible de la mort, tentent alors de mettre en avant l’alternative d’une fin de vie préférable plutôt que la légalisation d’une mort plus douce.
Un des arguments essentiels en faveur de la légalisation de l’euthanasie est que le patient devrait pouvoir choisir et prendre le contrôle de sa fin de vie. Mais, la liberté de choisir comprend aussi la liberté de changer d’avis ; l’acte irréversible qu’est la mort assistée serait donc inadaptée pour les patients en fin de vie. Selon cette approche, le patient qui recherche la mort ne voudrait en fait qu’abréger ses souffrances et aux portes de la mort. De plus, les législateurs considèrent que parfois la mort est souhaitée par le patient non pas pour mettre fin à ses douleurs mais pour éviter de devenir un « fardeau » pour sa famille. Ainsi, les législateurs sont formels : à cause du caractère irréversible et définitif de la mort assistée, cette dernière ne peut être légalisée sans porter atteinte à la liberté des patients de choisir et de changer d’avis.
Pour conclure, les législations françaises et anglaises ont évolué afin de garantir aux patients une fin de vie plus sereine. Grâce à la volonté d’éviter l’acharnement thérapeutique ou la possibilité de la sédation profonde et continue, les souffrances sont soulagées. Cependant, les législateurs restent fermes dans leur refus de légaliser l’assistance dans la mort. Pourtant, la société évolue et souhaite de plus en plus la légalisation de la mort assistée, comme en témoignent les propositions en ce sens de plusieurs candidats lors des dernières élections présidentielles en France et les nombreux sondages [2]. C’est pourquoi, en complément de ce premier article, un second projet, une interview, se concentrera sur les arguments en faveur de l’euthanasie.
[1]C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), Re [1994] 1 WLR 290 (Fam).
[2] Selon l’IFOP, Le regard des Français sur la fin de vie, avril 2021, 93% des Français souhaitaient la légalisation de l’euthanasie pour les personnes souffrant de maladies insupportables et incurables. En Angleterre, Populus (maintenant appelé Yonder), Dignity in Dying Poll, 2019 a établi que 84% supporte la légalisation de la mort assistée chez les malades en fin de vie.
The meeting, which will be held on 11-12 November 2021, encompasses several events, including the Research Forum, which features cutting-edge international law scholarship by more than 70 authors and is open to the public. Registration details are available here.
Marija’s presentation is titled ‘Redesigning Slavery Through Law: A Play in Four Acts’ and will be hosted by the Reimagining International Law panel, chaired by Professor Noah B. Novogrodsky of the University of Wyoming College of Law.
Marija’s paper investigates, in particular, the relationship between the law and slavery including ‘modern slavery’. It argues that just as states in the Global North have maintained ‘traditional’ slavery using law as a primary tool, so have they substituted the old with ‘modern slavery’ to accommodate and fulfil the needs of the present-day global economic order and political reality. This contradicts their projected image of the champions of the abolitionist movement and the recent global action against ‘modern slavery’.
This work is situated within Marija’s broader research on modern slavery and human trafficking, which explores how various aspects of law both contribute to and work to suppress these practices. It builds on her doctoral work, which is further developed in the book on State Responsibility for ‘Modern Slavery’ in Human Rights Law: A Right Not to be Trafficked forthcoming with the Oxford University Press in 2022.
The collection was edited by Ilias Bantekas (Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar) and Michael Ashley Stein (Harvard Law School, Massachusetts), and was published in September 2021 by Cambridge University Press.
How can businesses operate profitably and sustainably while ensuring that they are applying human rights? I. Bantekas and M. Stein (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Business and Human Rights Law (CUP 2021)
Marija’s chapter explains the role and responsibility of the business sector in securing the rights to work and just and favourable conditions of work by clarifying the origins, legal nature, scope, and enforcement of obligations placed upon corporate actors.
It explores the differences between the role of businesses and that of states in safeguarding these rights and seeks to establish whether any obligations placed upon business actors are owed to individuals employed by their subsidiaries and suppliers outside of their country of domicile.
The chapter reflects on the three modalities of framing obligations of the business sector to secure the rights to work and just and favourable conditions of work in today’s globalised economy. It also considers whether states have – or should have – an international obligation to enact and enforce legislation that enables individuals from other jurisdictions to seek redress for the violations of the two rights by their corporate nationals.
Marija’s contribution and the further twenty-four chapters of the Companion are intended to serve as both a specialist guide to businesses, states, and consumer organisations and civil society at large in their pursuit of business and human rights related actions and policies, as well as a comprehensive textbook for business and human rights modules.
The article examines how the regional organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia have redesigned the global regime on human trafficking established by the United Nations Palermo Protocol to suit the dominant regional agendas in the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Map indicating locations of European Union and ASEAN | Source: Wikimedia Commons
In seeking to consolidate and coordinate the implementation of the global anti-trafficking action across their respective member states, these regional actors have shaped and promoted fundamentally different understanding of the phenomenon of human trafficking and the actions needed to address it.
These findings challenge general assumptions about the universality and coherence of the growing international legal framework on human trafficking and show the capacity of regional actors to redefine international treaties in line with their specific mandates, pressing concerns and dominant agendas.
Dr. Jovanovic’s article can be accessed through the publisher’s website here.
Serial health risks are increasing in occurrence and have the capacity to affect large numbers of people living in different countries. Thalidomide, contaminated blood, Diethylstilboestrol (DES), asbestos and Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (BSE) are among some of the most well-known examples of serial health risks damaging human lives, but the recent Covid-19 outbreak reminds us that such risks have always existed, primarily in the form of epidemics. Yet, the legal treatment, in civil liability, of personal injury resulting from serial health risks often lacks clarity not only because serial health risks have diverse origins, but also because they can trigger different regimes of civil liability. Given their increasing importance and this lack of clarity, I devoted my PhD thesis to the comparison of how the French and English legal systems responded to serial health risks in civil liability. I concluded that while these two legal systems are facing similar legal challenges from a civil liability perspective, they have not always responded in a similar manner. In fact, I argued that their differences of approach highlight unreconcilable views as to the conception of civil liability, its role and its underlying objective. My analysis also led me to conclude that despite these differences, the legal treatment of victims of serial health risks remained unsatisfactory in both legal systems due to unjustifiable inequality of treatment. The following post will provide a summary of the key-findings from my PhD thesis.
Background
My interest in comparing the legal treatment of serial health risks in French and English civil liability stemmed from a theme that I uncovered while I was writing my master’s dissertation in France. At the time, I was working on issues of proof of causation in civil environmental liability in French and English law and discovered that, besides environmental cases, other cases raised similar issues of proof of causation.
Yet, these cases involved risks with diverse origins: the risks were occupational (asbestos, brick dust, mechanical vibrations, etc.), technological (electromagnetic waves, nuclear radiations), pharmaceutical (thalidomide, contaminated blood, DES, PIP prostheses, metal-on-metal hip prostheses, anti-hepatitis B vaccine, pertussis vaccine, etc.), food-related (BSE-contaminated beef), consumer-related (tobacco), industrial (Round-up) and environmental (pollution). More importantly, these cases triggered the application of different civil liability regimes: liability for defective products, nuisance, and negligence (employers/employees, producer/consumer, etc.).
Nevertheless, despite these important material differences, they also presented common features: claimants always suffered from diseases, a specific type of personal injury, and as a result, all cases were concerned with risks to human health; they were all connected to the widespread use of products and substances, therefore raising the number of victims to potentially catastrophic levels; finally, all involved serial damage, a legal concept sometimes used by continental legal scholars to refer to a type of damage that affects a number of people spread in various locations and at different times but connected to a common origin.
In summary, these cases were all dealing with health risks leading to serial damage which I will refer to as ‘serial health risks’. Given their common features, it was no surprise to observe that they often raise similar issues for the application of civil liability.
As I already mentioned, proof of causation is often a crucial issue in these litigations because our understanding of aetiology of diseases is generally fraught with significant gaps in scientific knowledge. As a consequence, the existence of scientific uncertainties is particularly challenging to the success of tort claims. Additionally, when numerous plaintiffs are similarly affected by the same substance or product, courts are likely to face a flood of tort claims. Large cohorts of claimants put a strain on the justice system, thereby leading to question whether the tort system is the best way forward in dealing with compensation, and if so, how it copes with large numbers of claimants.
Research question
While this area of litigation has become increasingly important both in the number of cases and in monetary value (potentially multi-millions pounds litigation), legal scholars have mostly purported to follow a sectoral approach, devoting their analysis to one legal issue at a time (causation, collective redress, etc.). I believed that a more comprehensive study of the interactions between serial health risks and civil liability was needed in order to bring clarity into this complex area of law and that drawing on the legal experiences of both the French and English legal systems could be beneficial to inform on how similar issues of civil liability were approached in legal systems with different legal traditions.
Through this comprehensive analysis, I sought to investigate how personal injury resulting from serial health risks was treated by civil liability in both legal systems.
Choice of jurisdictions and methodology
The French and English legal systems have been chosen because they have different legal traditions (civil law vs common law) and were influenced by European Union law. More importantly both legal systems were good comparators because they have had to deal with the same issues of serial health risks at a similar point in time using the same scientific knowledge available, examples being contaminated blood, asbestos or BSE. For this reason, the comparison of French and English responses to this new problem seemed particularly apposite.
To conduct my research, I borrowed from both functional and contextualist methods of comparison. When looking at the practical issues connected to the application of civil liability in the context of serial health risks and the solutions developed in French and English law to address them, I used a functional method through a careful examination of French and English jurisprudence. However, I believed this approach to be limited: while the solutions adopted in both legal systems could be functionally equivalent, they could nonetheless be justified by different reasons. Hence the real divergences between legal systems could well remain hidden if my analysis was limited to a functional approach. I therefore complemented my comparative work with an analysis of political and social contexts to identify the underlying reasons and objectives behind the adoption of solutions in French and English law.
Comparative findings
My main findings can be summarised as follows:
The comparative analysis revealed that French and English law are moving towards improving the protection of victims’ interests in the context of serial health risks.
For example, both legal systems introduced compensation schemes to provide victims of certain serial health risks with expedient compensation under more flexible requirements than that of civil liability. Such schemes have benefited victims of contaminated blood, asbestos, vaccines (France and England), Diethylstilboestrol (DES), Mediator, Depakine (France), and BSE (England). Furthermore, French and English legislators have introduced strict liability regimes in sectors of activity where serial health risks could materialise with the aim to facilitate defendants being held legally liable. The introduction of the nuclear liability regime and the liability for defective products are the most seminal examples (chapter 3).
Similarly, I show that collective redress mechanisms have been introduced in the French and English legal systems not only to cope with large cohorts of claimants seeking compensation through judicial process but also as a means to restore the ‘balance of power’ between plaintiffs (private individuals) and defendants (often large companies) through allowing individual plaintiffs to aggregate (Goliath v. Goliath). I demonstrate that the conditions to launch group litigations are designed to deal with victims of mass torts which include victims of serial health risks, although I also identified difficulties in both legal systems which impede the efficacy of these mechanisms in practice.
Finally, the analysis of case-law provided me with clear evidence that proof of the traditional requirements of civil liability (in particular causation) has sometimes been adapted to allow victims of serial health risks to succeed where they should have normally failed (chapter 5 to 10). Once again, this is indicative of the importance given to victims’ interests from a civil liability perspective.
However, despite these converging evolutions, I conclude that the treatment of serial health risks in French and English civil liability remains fundamentally different.
For example, the comparison of French and English compensation schemes in the context of serial health risks reveals that while French schemes are often designed as an alternative compensation mechanism to the tort system, English statutory schemes are engineered as a supplementary compensation mechanism to the tort system. In other words, where French compensation schemes generally compete with the tort system, English statutory schemes are created as a last resort mechanism and can only be actioned when all else fails. This important divergence underlines the fact that the French legal system readily separates compensation from civil liability in order to promote compensation while the English system continues to see the tort system as the primary route for obtaining redress. Similarly, while legislators on both sides have introduced strict liability regimes, their number remains limited in England while in France they continue to grow. This suggests a willingness by the French legal system to move from fault-based liability to strict liability. In contrast the English legal system is reluctant to depart from the fault principle to compensate personal injury resulting from serial health risks (chapter 3).
The application of tort law rules to situations of serial health risks is another striking example of the different approaches taken by the two legal systems. In chapter 2, I developed a detailed typology of serial health risks based on the level of scientific knowledge and distinguished ‘known’, ‘suspected’ and ‘unknown’ risks. In chapter 5 to 10, I used this typology to examine the judicial treatment of serial health risks in French and English civil liability. In French law, I found that the conditions of civil liability are consistently adapted, and that proof of these requirements are facilitated to ensure that the victims could obtain compensation, regardless of whether the situation is one where the risk is unknown, suspected or known. In other words, French law favours victims’ compensation in all situations of serial health risks. Conversely, the position is much more nuanced in English law: the less knowledge that is available as to the existence of risk, the less likely it is that relaxation of tort law will be accepted (chapter 6 to 10). As a result, proof of causation has been adapted where risks are known but not where risks are either suspected or unknown.
I argued that the aforementioned differences are not simply differences of degree between the legal systems. Rather they show irreconcilable views as to the role played by civil liability in the context of serial health risks.
When considering the balance between the protection of bodily integrity (claimants’ interest) and the protection of economic freedom (defendants’ interest), the French legal system took the clear view that the protection of bodily integrity is to be favoured in the context of serial health risks. To this effect, civil liability is simultaneously declining due to other compensation mechanisms emerging, and yet strengthened due to the introduction of strict liability regimes, collective redress mechanisms and relaxation of tort law conditions. These conflicting trends can all be explained when regarding the underlying goal being pursued in French law, which is ensuring that victims of serial health risks obtain compensation. The interests of defendants are therefore systematically sacrificed.
The English legal system has made another choice. While the protection of bodily integrity is undeniably important, it is not a sufficient reason, in and of itself, to sacrifice the defendants’ interests. Other reasons are needed to support a relaxation of the traditional rules of civil liability and examination of English case law reveals that judges are careful to evaluate conflicting interests to determine which one should be given precedence. This explains why the more scientific uncertainty there is with regards to the existence of the risk, the less willing English law is to relax the traditional rules of tort law. This approach reveals that English law is much more concerned than French law with the need to strike an appropriate balance between the protection of bodily integrity and the protection of economic freedom.
Finally, I found the legal treatment of serial health risks to be unsatisfactory in both France and England, albeit for different reasons.
If, as my analysis suggests, the French legal system is overly concerned with the compensation of victims of serial health risks, then the arrangements currently in place are not satisfactory, especially when considering the solutions crafted through legislature. French legislators have succumbed to the temptation to develop solutions on a sector-by-sector basis which can lead to victims being treated differently simply because serial health risks have different origins. For example, French legislators introduced collective redress for victims of personal injury in the health sector but not in relation to the food industry. As a result, thalidomide-type victims could benefit from group litigations but not BSE-type victims. I found this sectoral approach to be sorely lacking and difficult to justify.
The English legal system has favoured an approach whereby victims of serial health risks are treated differently depending on the level of scientific knowledge available. I argued that this approach can be justified and is more rational than that adopted in French law which differentiates victims according to the origin of serial health risks. Yet, the English approach is not without problems because it can also lead to victims of serial health risks being treated differently for no valid reason. English judges are trying to preserve a balance between conflicting interests (bodily integrity vs economic freedom) which results in relaxation of traditional rules to have limited applicability. In order to ensure limited applicability, English judges are drawing subtle distinctions between cases. For instance, the applicability of exceptional rules of causation (chapter 9 and 10) depend on whether the situation is one of alternative or cumulative causation, whether there is one or multiple noxious agents at play, whether the disease is divisible or indivisible. Hard cases often challenge the practicality of these distinctions and reveal that, as is the case in France, victims of serial health risks can be treated differently with little rationality behind the solutions. The worst example is linked to victims of asbestos where the solutions depend on whether such victims are suffering from mesothelioma, a specific disease linked to asbestos exposure, or not.
Conclusive thoughts
This comparative analysis was designed as a starting point. It aimed to provide a clear picture of the current position of how French and English law are dealing with the fallout of serial health risks from a civil liability perspective. Shortcomings have been identified in both legal systems which need to be addressed in future work to ensure that victims of serial health risks are treated more equally. The recent Covid-19 outbreak, probably the biggest serial health risk that our generation had to face, serves to reinforce this point.
Essential workers have put their lives on the line to allow for essential activities to continue during the lockdown. Healthcare professionals and carers primarily, but also supermarket workers, train and bus drivers, firefighters, postmen and delivery men amongst many others have had to work, sometimes in very close proximity to the general public, in order to deliver these essential services. Some of them, as we know, have died due to Covid-19 therefore raising the question of whether the State should step in to provide some type of compensation to essential workers and their bereaved families. It would appear that, once again, not all key workers have been treated the same. In particular, healthcare professionals and carers have benefited from special arrangements both in France and in England, a “privilege” that was not extended to other key workers.
While the nature of the work conducted by healthcare professionals and carers undeniably put them at a high risk of contamination from Covid-19, the same could be said of all key workers who have had to work in contact with the public. Why then should some essential workers be treated better than others? This latest example shows that unless we are planning on rethinking our general approach to serial health risks, the shortcomings previously identified in my work will be further aggravated.
This post originally appeared on the British Association of Comparative Law Blog and is reproduced here with permission and thanks.
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