The Anatomy of Impact: A Conversation with Professor Lorna Woods

Photo by Joshua Hoehne on Unsplash

By Professor Carla Ferstman, Director of Impact, Essex Law School

As academics, we conduct research for all sorts of reasons. We seek to advance knowledge and innovation in the areas in which we specialise, and we try to make connections with research being done in other disciplines for the purpose of enhancing our understanding of and contributing to address cross-cutting, complex challenges.

Academic research is increasingly being applied outside of academia to foster external impacts in our communities and societies. Research-led teaching can also foster the opportunities for cutting-edge, student learning.

The UK Research Excellence Framework values world-leading research that is rigorous, significant and original. It also encourages and rewards research that generates impact, which it understands as “an effect on, change, or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia” (REF2021).

Impactful research is particularly relevant and important for the discipline of law, where colleagues’ work can lead to changes in how justice is perceived and how access to justice can be better achieved. Academic research in law has led to and influenced the direction of law reform and academic findings have also been applied authoritatively in court judgments. Legal research has also led to the development of new policies, and regulatory frameworks in the UK and internationally.

Despite the importance many legal academics place on generating impact, the route to impact is not obvious. Achieving impactful academic research defies a one-size-fits-all formula, though certain key pointers are invaluable:

First, impactful research is generated by academics who produce excellent, groundbreaking research.

Second, academics should be mindful of who (e.g., community stakeholders, policy-makers, decision-makers) would benefit from knowing about the research and should develop a strategy to ensure they effectively disseminate their findings.

Third, academics seeking to generate impactful research should be actively engaging with those who can benefit from their research, adapting their approach based on stakeholder needs and circumstances.  

Learning from example

Academics can glean wisdom from exemplary models. And there is no better example than Professor Lorna Woods, whose research contributed significantly to the Online Safety Bill (now Online Safety Act 2023) and led to her being awarded an OBE for services to internet safety policy.

I sat down with Professor Woods to get a clearer understanding of her trajectory – how she got from A to B to C (or indeed, from B to A to F to C), to better appreciate the time her ideas took to percolate and the challenges she faced along the way.

I wanted to understand whether her research was picked up by government by happenstance, by carefully, plodded planning, or some other combination. I also wanted to know whether there was any magic formula she could share to generating impactful research.

Lorna qualified as a solicitor and worked in the early 1990s for a London city firm, where she was exposed to a variety of areas of law, including international trade, competition, and commercial law. She began to work with two of the partners on matters involving regulation, intellectual property, and media. She happened to be at the firm when many developments  in the law occurred, such as the Broadcasting Act 1990, up-dates in data protection rules, and other changes as a result of growing public access to the internet.

This quickly developed into a specialism related to technology. “The work was really interesting. It wasn’t just the typical due diligence or deals management work that one often received in a corporate solicitor’s firm, there was a space to think and a space to have your say”.

Also, during this time, Lorna did some consulting work for the European Commission in Eastern European countries following the political changes in the early 1990s, focused on media freedom and public service broadcasting, which involved new thinking about the rights of the public audience that had not yet been theorised.

Lorna left the firm after about five years when, as often happens, she began to take on a more supervisory role, with some of the most interesting pieces of work being delegated to more junior colleagues. She pursued an LL.M degree at the University of Edinburgh (legal theory and human rights, with a dissertation on federalism and the European Union) and began to apply for academic roles. She secured a position in 1994 at Sheffield and began teaching EU and public law.

The Eureka moment or more of a slow-burner?

Gradually Lorna’s research began to drift back to media law and data protection, incorporating areas she had been studying around human rights, public speech, surveillance, and the rights of journalists, but with her own take. She recalled that “A lot of people were talking about journalists’ rights, but I was focussed on the rights of the companies who were transmitting; an ‘essential facilities’ argument but approached from a rights perspective. I also started looking at these issues from the perspectives of EU law and the free movement of cultural standards [the rights of the audience] rather than simply as an issue of freedom of expression.”

Central to this was the idea that there were different actors in an information environment – the speakers and the audience, and something in the middle which had more to do with the platform, that is not really seen or thought about. The question Lorna had was whether these entailed separate rights or were all part of a unified right to information.

In 2000, Lorna was collaborating with Professor Jackie Harrison at Sheffield and they began researching new media and media regulation, and again, this is where she conceptualised further her thoughts on the rights of the audience not only to have access to information, but to information that was reasonably reliable, and where possible, to a diversity and plurality of sources.

This also connected to her thinking about how to find information on the internet, who curates what we can find and what responsibilities may be attached to the curation. The flip side to this was considering the nature of states’ positive obligations to provide a safe online environment. Lorna also began to explore issues around usergenerated content.

In response to the growing awareness of how female politicians and activists were being targeted on Twitter (now X), and the notoriety of the abuse faced by Caroline Criado Perez and Walthamstow MP Stella Creasy, Lorna started looking at what controls were in place, and began to consider the gaps in regulation and how they could best be addressed.

At the time, she observed that politicians had embraced Twitter, amplifying their influence while also making them more accessible and exposed. The platform facilitated direct communications between everyone on the network, including with unsavoury individuals who were using the platform as a form of abuse. This was fuelled by anonymous accounts, hashtags that allow you to jump on the bandwagon, and little seeming moderation at that stage. There were many instances of public-facing women receiving rape and death threats.

In consequence, there were several instances in which users were being charged in the UK under section 127 of the Communications Act – a low-grade offence which criminalises the sending, via a “public electronic communications network”, of a message which is “grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”. But it was never clear to Lorna that using the criminal law was the best solution to the problem.

The campaign for law reform begins to take shape

Around 2015, Lorna became aware that the then Labour MP Anna Turley MP was developing a private member’s bill:  the Malicious Communications (Social Media) Bill. Someone whom Lorna had met in an unrelated capacity – “this is just really a feature of when you work in a certain area, you meet people linked to that area. And progressively, your army of contacts comes back to help” – William Perrin, managed to get her in the door to meet the MP.

Together, Lorna and William helped to draft the Bill. The goal was to give users better tools (user empowerment features and functionalities) so that they could filter and triage incoming content, at least as a starting point for improving the online environment. Their advice (which was taken on board) was not to remove platform immunity for third-party content; they recognised that the platform providers were offering an important service worth protecting.

Part of the rationale for this was the connections they saw between internet platform providers and telecoms providers: “If you were to hold a telecoms provider responsible for anything communicated on the service, they would become very cautious and ultimately it would shut down the service.  So, there was a need for caution.” Ultimately the Bill did not progress because private members’ bills rarely do but they operate to bring matters to the attention of the Government and can be part of a campaign for change.

Subsequently, the Government published a Green Paper on internet safety in 2017, where significant concerns were raised. This was the era of Cambridge Analytica and misinformation, but there were also concerns about child pornography and online bullying, and the algorithms prioritising content to vulnerable users stemming from the tragic Molly Russell case.  The Green Paper seemed to revisit the recommendation to remove (or significantly restrict) platform immunity for third-party content, which Lorna and William did not think was the best approach, for the reasons already stated.

There was a need to conceive of the problem at the systems level, rather than merely focusing on isolated items of content. For example, the scale of the problem invariably was not about the individual offensive posts but that the content was quickly able to go viral without appropriate controls, aided by functions like the “like” button, and the availability of anonymous, disposable accounts.

Similarly, the recommender algorithm which optimised certain posts for engagement tended to privilege the most irrational, emotional posts which were more likely to promote hatred or cause offence. Making small changes to these kinds of features and investing more in customer response, could significantly improve online safety.  Thus, according to Lorna, there was a certain recklessness in the product design that needed to be addressed – this was the genesis of the idea of a statutory duty of care. 

Paws for thought: remembering Faith, Lorna’s beloved cat who ‘Zoom-bombed’ video calls during lockdown and contributed much to debates on online safety

The statutory duty of care

Lorna and William produced a series of blogs and papers outlining this position, and the need for such reforms was also underscored by Lorna during an oral evidence session at the House of Lords inquiry into the regulation of the internet. The Carnegie UK Trust stepped up to champion Lorna and William’s work, facilitating its progress.

The UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) invited Lorna to give a briefing, and it became clear that there was some confusion. The DCMS had been under the impression that the conditionality of the platform immunity amounted to a statutory duty of care. Consequently, part of what Lorna and Will tried to explain was how their proposal was compatible with the principle of platform or intermediary immunity. The proposal was not seeking to impose liability on the platform for user content but instead, focused on requiring platforms to ensure product design met their duty of care to users. These discussions with DCMS continued, and progressively intensified.

The White Paper which was ultimately released in April 2019 clearly articulated that “The government will establish a new statutory duty of care to make companies take more responsibility for the safety of their users and tackle harm caused by content or activity on their services,” and outlined what that duty of care would look like and how it would be regulated.  

Changes within the Tory leadership ultimately delayed progress. There were also concerns raised by some of those in the free speech lobby who saw parts of what was being proposed as censorship.  Lorna’s background in freedom of speech helped her respond to those concerns: “I was concerned that freedom of speech was being used as a slogan. When you look at any right and you look at it in isolation, you are then implicitly privileging it. And here, it was important not just to consider the rights of the ‘speaker’ but the rights of all the other users as well, some of whom are extremely vulnerable.” 

These points align with what the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression explained in her 2023 report on gendered disinformation, who notes, citing Lorna’s submission, that “Systemic regulation, which emphasizes ‘architecture over takedown’, allows for more proportionate responses and is likely to be better aligned with freedom of expression standards.”

Certainly, companies were lobbying in other directions and the Act reflects some corporate compromises, such as the need for the duty of care to be applied proportionately, to account for the different levels of resources of the regulated company. But there were powerful counter-arguments, and the NSPCC and other organisations were effective allies particularly on the need for clear duties of care in relation to child users. The Daily Telegraph also ran an important campaign on the legislation. The Government at one point sought to restrict the Act to concerns about children, so this became part of the campaign to maintain a focus also on harm to adults (unfortunately only limited protections were maintained). There are other parts of the Act which differ from what Lorna and William had proposed, such as dividing up the regulatory framework by reference to certain types of conduct. Inevitably there were compromises.

The Act as adopted envisages that the communications regulator Ofcom will produce guidance and codes which will explain what internet platforms must do in order to operate in the United Kingdom. There are ongoing consultations regarding these texts. Once the guidance and codes are in place, companies will be given a period (three months) to align their practice to comply with the requirements. Thereafter, the duties of care will become binding.

Some of the companies appear to be arguing that a duty of care is too vague a standard, however this is hard to accept, given that it is a recognised legal standard. The goal for Lorna and others is therefore to ensure that the duty of care standard is made operational in such a way that it provides clear and adequate protections; it should be more than a ‘tick the box’ exercise.

I asked Lorna how this legislation would tackle the activities of companies operating outside of the UK, but with impacts in the UK. She explained that parts of the Act have extraterritorial effect, to the extent that company activities are directed at or have impacts in the UK. Some companies have introduced policies for different geographical regions to address the requirements of national legislation, so this is a possibility for multinational internet platforms accessible to UK users.  

I also discussed with Lorna whether she believed individuals like Molly Russell would be more effectively safeguarded now that the Online Safety Act is in force. She explained that Molly would not be better off today, because the guidance and codes are not yet in place. “Maybe in a year’s time, she would probably be better protected, as a child. I think an 18-year-old Molly would be sadly let down by the regime, which should be more robust.”

Given the clear synergies with her work on the Act, Lorna is also progressing with work on online gender-based violence, and some work on gender-misinformation, incel and extremism. As she looks deeper into these critical areas, it becomes evident that her ongoing endeavours reveal new challenges and fresh avenues for advocacy and change.

Building Better Communities? Examining How Section 106 Agreements Shape Local Development

Photo by Breno Assis on Unsplash

By Dr Edward Mitchell, Essex Law School

Picture a city with an acute housing shortage. Now, envision a plot of land formerly used for industrial purposes, now vacant following a fire that razed most of its buildings two decades ago. Next, imagine a property development initiative set to deliver 150 shiny new houses and 100 smart apartments on that very site. Finally, consider that the project also includes plans for landscaped stretches of open space and a dedicated area earmarked for on-site biodiversity protection.

In this fictional setting, 250 new homes sound great. The open space and the bio-diversity protection area sound good too. But let’s also imagine some potential adverse effects of the development. Perhaps there are many families in acute housing need in the local area who will be priced out of the development. Maybe local primary and secondary schools are already oversubscribed. Perhaps traffic crawls along local roads at the pace of a sedated snail.

Can a local authority compel the developer carrying out this type of development project to mitigate these adverse effects?

In a recent article published in the journal Current Legal Problems, I explore this complex issue.

My article develops ideas I discussed in a lecture I gave in December 2023 as part of UCL’s flagship Current Legal Problems lecture series and expands upon work I previously discussed in a blog on the role of contracts in contemporary town planning. In my lecture and blog post, I highlighted tensions in current planning practice that arise when local authorities rely on private developers to provide public goods that the local authority has identified as important.

UCL Current Legal Problems Lecture: Contracting in the public interest? Re-examining contract in contemporary town planning processes

I build on my earlier work in my latest article by investigating how local authorities and developers create ‘planning obligations’ to mitigate the potentially adverse effects of property development on local communities and on local infrastructure needs. The planning obligations that I discuss are made by local authorities and developers by agreement pursuant to section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The article asks important questions about the detailed and highly intricate framework of duties, rights and powers that these ‘section 106 agreements’ create.

I base my analysis in the article on two case study developments. Examining the section 106 agreements created for these developments enables me to provide rich insights into this complex area of legal and planning practice.

I summarise my findings below.

Finding 1: A limited role in ordering ‘private’ relations

In most property development projects, the developer will seek to obtain planning permission by applying to the planning part of a local authority. Before the local authority grants planning permission, the local authority and the developer will usually identify potential negative effects of the proposed development, and the two parties will negotiate planning obligations to be secured in a section 106 agreement. These obligations might aim to mitigate the development’s negative impacts through the provision, by the developer, of funding for local schools, affordable housing, and local amenities, amongst other things.

When a developer and a local authority enter into a section 106 agreement, the developer should perform the planning obligations and the local authority can enforce them.

The first key issue that my article considers is the nature of the ‘private’ bilateral contractual relations between a developer and a local authority that a section 106 agreement creates.

I ask an important question about this in my article: How do section 106 agreements contribute to a development culture in which private developers do not always perform their public policy obligations?

In the pursuit of answers to this question, I examine the content of the obligations in the section 106 agreements created for my case study developments, I scrutinise monitoring arrangements and I investigate enforcement powers.

In the article, I explain the first key insight from my case studies as follows:

My [case studies] show how these agreements consist of administrative clauses that appear to create an intricate framework of rights, responsibilities, duties and powers relating to the performance of planning obligations. But I also showed how the detail, complexity and apparent rigidity of the obligations in the agreements belies the one-sidedness and the haphazardness of these arrangements. This is important, and suggests that these agreements are ill-equipped to serve as effective instruments for ordering the ‘private’ relations between a [local authority] and a developer.

Finding 2: New questions about the ‘expressive force’ of section 106 agreements

A further crucial finding that my article presents relates to the public-facing work that section 106 agreements do.

My second case study involved a development proposed for a site where ownership of the land was divided amongst multiple unwilling sellers. The local authority had granted a developer planning permission for that development and, to enable that development to take place, had agreed to use its compulsory purchase powers to acquire the entire site.

The land acquisition context of this development enables me to analyse the operation of section 106 agreements as a justificatory device local authorities and developers deploy at planning inquiries convened to consider the use of compulsory purchase powers.

Alongside this, another striking aspect of my second case study development was the way that the section 106 agreement addressed local policies relating to affordable housing provision.

In my article, I ask a second important research question: How does the presence of ostensibly binding promises in section 106 agreements facilitate the exercise of regulatory decision-making in planning and property development processes?

By examining my second case study development, I conclude in my article as follows:

My discussion here presents new findings showing how these agreements can have a powerful expressive force in signalling a commitment to public policy interests that ‘de-risks’ these contentious land acquisition and affordable housing issues for developers and local authorities (Legacy and others 2023). But the crucial point in this section is that these agreements do this despite the emptiness of the commitments that they sometimes contain. These findings demonstrate how planning scholarship needs to look beyond the impression of binding force that a section 106 agreement creates to scrutinise the way that these agreements reinforce uneven outcomes and marginalise certain interests.

Photo by Maximillian Conacher on Unsplash

Finding 3: The need for greater transparency and community participation

My second case study provides an opportunity to examine a section 106 agreement containing developer obligations designed to discharge a local authority’s public sector equality duty.

The third research question that my article asks relates to this public sector equality duty. I ask: How do local authorities manage the implementation of novel developer obligations designed to shape broader community relations?

In my article, I describe my findings in response to this question as follows:

[Making] a section 106 agreement containing developer obligations designed to discharge a local authority’s public sector equalities duty … is an innovative and under-explored way of using a section 106 agreement, so this part of the paper provides a rare insight into the more unusual obligations in these agreements and into the practical challenges local authorities can face when monitoring the implementation of novel planning devices.

My findings also enable me to explain how equalities considerations created a focal point for opposition to an apparently settled development trajectory.

I argue that this highlights the need for greater transparency and public involvement in setting and implementing planning obligations.

Agenda for further research

Planning, public law and contract law scholars will find helpful insights in my article about the diverse and multilayered roles contractual arrangements play in current regulatory practices.

But while my article highlights various problems with the current use of section 106 agreements, understanding how local authorities might more effectively compel developers to mitigate the impacts of property development requires further research.

Here are some key areas where a greater understanding of section 106 agreements and their use might enable insights that would inform better practice:

  • How might planning law and planning practice enable greater transparency and public involvement in setting and implementing planning obligations?
  • How do planners and lawyers gather and use the monitoring information about developer behaviour theoretically made accessible through the section 106 agreements studied in my article?
  • How do planners and lawyers use the enforcement powers contained in section 106 agreements, and could they use those powers differently?

New communications offences enacted by the Online Safety Act 2023

Photo by Ravi Sharma on Unsplash

Dr. Alexandros Antoniou, Essex Law School

The Online Safety Act 2023 (OSA) introduced a range of measures intended to improve online safety in the UK, including duties on internet platforms about having systems and processes in place to manage illegal and harmful content on their sites. On 31 January 2024, Part 10 of the Act came into effect, introducing a series of new criminal offences which represent a significant leap forward in tackling complex challenges surrounding online communications safety.

Section 179 of the OSA establishes the criminal offence of sending false communications and seeks to target, among others, internet trolls. It is now deemed an offence if an individual (a) sends a message containing knowingly false information; (b) intends, at the time of sending, to cause non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience; and (c) lacks a reasonable excuse for sending the message. Recognised news publishers and broadcasters are exempt. The offence does not apply to public screenings of cinema films either. It can be committed by individuals outside the UK if they are habitually resident in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland. Penalties include imprisonment for up to six months, a fine, or both. It is hoped the new offence will help clamp down on disinformation and election interference online.

Section 181 establishes the criminal offence of sending threatening communications. This is committed when an individual sends a message containing a threat of death, serious harm (e.g. bodily injury, rape, assault by penetration), or serious financial loss, with the intent to instil fear in the recipient that the threat will be carried out (whether by the sender or someone else). In cases of threats involving financial loss, a defence is available if the threat was used to support a reasonable demand, and the sender reasonably believed it was an appropriate way to reinforce that demand. This offence applies to individuals residing in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, even if the sender is located outside the UK. Penalties include up to five years of imprisonment, a fine, or both. In March 2024, Essex law enforcement achieved a significant milestone by obtaining one of the earliest convictions under the new OSA, resulting in an eight-month jail sentence for Karn Statham. Statham harassed a woman by sending threatening messages and making repeated visits to her address after being instructed to cease contact.

A new criminal offence under section 183, dubbed “Zach’s law”, aims to protect people from “epilepsy trolling”. The campaign against such conduct began when eight-year-old Zach, who has epilepsy, was raising funds for the Epilepsy Society. Trolls inundated the Society’s profile with images and GIFs meant to induce seizures in people with epilepsy. While Zach was unharmed, others with the condition reported seizures after engaging with the fundraiser online. The Act creates the offence of deliberately sending or showing flashing images to individuals with epilepsy with the intent to cause harm, defined as inducing a seizure, alarm, or distress. Particular conditions (specified in the Act) must be met before a conviction is secured, both in respect to sending and showing flashing images electronically. Recognised news publishers, broadcasters, public screenings of cinema films as well as healthcare professionals cannot be guilty of this offence (which can similarly be committed by individuals outside the UK if they are habitually resident in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland). Penalties include imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both.

Moreover, section 184 outlaws encouraging or assisting serious self-harm. To be guilty of this offence, an individual must perform an act intended to encourage or assist serious self-harm in another person, whether through direct communication, publication or sending (or giving) items with stored electronic data. Serious self-harm encompasses actions leading to grievous bodily harm, including acts of omission such as encouraging someone to neglect their health regimen. The identity of the person harmed need not be known to the offender. The offence can occur regardless of whether self-harm is carried out and it is irrelevant who created the content in question (it is the sending that matters). The offence is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both, and likewise, it applies to individuals habitually resident in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, even if they are outside the UK.

Cyber-flashing on dating apps, AirDrop and other platforms will also result in perpetrators facing up to two years in prison. Section 187 of the Act introduces a new offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 pertaining to the sending of photographs or films of a person’s genitals to another individual. A person (A) is deemed to commit the offence if they intentionally send or provide a photo or video of another person’s genitals to another individual (B) under the following conditions: either A intends for B to view the genitals and experience alarm, distress, or humiliation; or A sends or provides such material with the aim of obtaining sexual gratification and is reckless as to whether B will experience alarm, distress, or humiliation. “Sending” covers sending through any means, including electronic methods, showing it to another person, or placing it for someone to find. A conviction for this offence could also lead to inclusion on the sex offenders’ register. In February 2024, an Essex Police team secured the UK’s first cyber-flashing conviction, with Nicholas Hawkes pleading guilty to sending explicit images via WhatsApp to cause distress. On 19 March 2024, Hawkes was sentenced to 66 weeks in prison. He was also made subject to a restraining order for 10 years and a Sexual Harm Prevention Order for 15 years.

Finally, the OSA repeals the legislation first introduced to tackle ‘revenge porn’ offences (sections 33-35 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015) and introduces a set of intimate image sharing offences. Specifically, section 188 of the OSA introduces a new base offence of sharing of intimate images without consent, carrying a penalty of imprisonment for up to six months. This applies when an individual intentionally shares an image portraying another person in an intimate context without their consent and without a reasonable belief in consent. Two more serious offences are established on top of that, both reflecting the offender’s higher culpability and carrying greater penalties: namely (a) intentionally causing alarm, distress, or humiliation to the person in the image; and (b) seeking sexual gratification from the act (these are outlined in sections 66B(2) and (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003). Threatening to share an intimate image of a person has also been made an offence where the perpetrator either intends to cause fear that the threat will be carried out or acts recklessly in doing so (this is found under section 66B(4) of the aforementioned 2003 Act). The new offences also fall under the sexual offender notification requirements. These new intimate image offences are also designed to tackle “deepfakes” and “down-blousing” (i.e. capturing images typically of a person’s chest area, from a downward angle, often without their knowledge or consent). They also come with various exemptions (outlined under section 66C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003), e.g. where the photograph or film involves a child and is of a kind normally shared among family and friends.

While there is some overlap between existing offences, the new offences consolidate previous ones or address gaps. For example, the intimate image sharing offence widens the meaning of the photographs or films, from “private sexual” to “intimate” and makes it easier for those caught sharing such content online without the other person’s consent to be prosecuted, as it removes the requirement for any harm to be intended to the subject of the photograph or film. The updated guidance of the Crown Prosecution Service aims to delineate the appropriate charge for each circumstance. The introduction of the new offences is anticipated to fortify protections against online misconduct.


This article was first published on the IRIS Merlin database and is reproduced here with permission and thanks.